Egypt with Jawhar's army and had a quarter of their own, and one of Cairo's gates was named after them. The Zuwayla also appear in a list of military units from 395/1004-1005.28 Further information regarding them is unavailable. How the disappearance of the references to the Zuwayla from the sources should be understood poses a difficult question. One way of interpretation is to regard the lack of references as an indication of the disbandment or even liquidation of the Zuwayla troops. There is, however, no direct or indirect evidence for this. A more plausible explanation might be that the numbers of Zuwayla troops dwindled because of difficulties in supply and therefore their activity and importance were much reduced.
The Barqiyya and Bdtiliyya
Both these groups were of North African origin. They arrived in Egypt with Jawhar's army and established quarters of their own in Cairo. From that time on they are referred to as military groups. In 387/997, the Batiliyya were very active in looting the properties of the defeated Kutami leader Ibn CAmmar.29 In Rajab 415/September-October 1024, units of Barqiyya and Batiliyya were dispatched to Upper Egypt (Sa'id) to reinforce the governor who was faced with a rebellion.30 The sources contain two additional but non-informative references to Batiliyya for the same year.31 Nasir-i Khusrau, the Persian Shi'i missionary (ddCT) who visited Egypt in the fourth decade of the eleventh century, reports that he observed 15,000 Batili horsemen taking part in a military review in Cairo.32
The CAbid Black slave troops were used by the Aghlabids as well as by the Tulunids and the Ikhshidids.33 The Fatimids used abid from the inception of their state in Ifriqiya.34 The 'abid, along with the Kutama, bore the brunt of the fighting against Abu Yazid.35 Although 'abid are not mentioned among the units of Jawhar's army, they were part of the Fatimid army during the reign of al-'Aziz. In 388/998, two years after al-'Aziz's death, we find purchased black slaves ('abtd al-shird') fighting against the rebel 'Allaqa in Tyre.36 From the context, it seems that they were part of the Fatimid garrisons in Syria. The great expansion of 'abid occurred during the reign of al-Hakim. The sources say that al-Hakim bought black slaves (al-sudan) on a large scale, many of whom he set free, conferring patronage upon them.37 The massive inclusion of blacks in the Fatimid army had a destabilizing effect on relations with the civilian population as well as other military groups. Maqrfz? tells of killings and depredations suffered by the population (al-nas) at the hands of the 'abid.38 NuwayrT says that al-Hakim felt strong indignation against the Turks who rioted against the foreign da'is when they became frequent visitors in Cairo during the last years of his reign. Al-Hakim decided to take revenge by putting black officers (muqaddim al-suddn) and their foot soldiers (al-rajjala) in positions of command over the Turks. The Turks resented this action by al-Hakim and a massive fight took place in Fustat (Dhu 'l-qa'da 410/February-March 1020).39 On another occasion, purchased slave troops cooperated with other military corps (Qaysariyya and the elite of the Berbers [al-khdssa min al-Maghdriba]) in looting the markets in the capital.40 However, on another occasion, the blacks (al-suddn wa-'l-abld) joined the population (ralcyya) and rabble (rada') against the dhimmis.41 Clashes between 'abid, the population of Fustat, and other military groups took place during the reign of al-Zahir (411-427/1021-1036) as well. The picture of al-Zahir's reign is somewhat distorted. Due to the surviving parts of Musabbihi's Akhbdr Misr, we have detailed information regarding the years 414-415/1024-1025, which were marked by a severe economic crisis.42 All of the references to disorderly behavior of black slave troops come from these two years. The army as a whole was in very poor condition and its fighting capability reduced. Nevertheless, the frequent involvement of the cabid in disorderly behavior suggests that they were worse off than other socio-military groups. A few examples will demonstrate this point. The population of Fustat lived in constant fear of the 'abid and panicked easily.43 The 'abid were unpaid and their hunger reduced them to eating dogs. The worst riots involving cabid erupted on Wednesday, 23 Dhu 'l-hijja 415/25 February 1025. 'Abid al-Jawwala (a corp composed of blacks, see below) and robbers (nahhaba), which totaled more than 1,000 men, marched in the direction of Fustat threatening to plunder the town. Al-Zahir sent ghilman and infantry (rajjala) to defend the town and authorized the population (al-ra'iyya) to kill 'abid in self-defense. Mi'dad, a black eunuch, freedman of al-Zahir, and the leading personage in the court, promised the cabid that they would be paid the next day. On Thursday, however, the 'abid attacked the area of the grain port (al-sawdhil) of the capital looting wheat (qamh), barley (sha`tr), and other available grains (hubub), while also setting houses on fire. The armed mob ('dmma) of Fustat fought them with the help of al-'attdlun (police force?) and naphtha-hurlers (al-naffdtun). Eventually, Micdad himself arrived with the Saqaliba of the palace (Saqaliba al-qasr) to assist in repelling the 'abid.44 Other disturbances caused by the cabid occurred in the provinces. Rijdl al-Sudan, which were dispatched to protect Tinnis, rioted in demand of a pay raise and looted the city.45 Ashminayn was looted by the Jawwala and the bedouins.46 The Jawwdla who were stationed in the rural areas (arydf) of Lower Egypt (Asfal al-Ard) were subjected to harsh punitive action taken against them by the military commander (mutawallT 'I-sayydrdt) of the province.47
Occasionally, black slave troops also performed military duties in the provinces and the capital: cAbid, for example, were dispatched to Upper Egypt to quell a rebellion there (415/1025).48 At a time of a severe crisis in grain supplies, al-Rajjdla and al-Sacdiyya were used by the supervisor of the markets (mutawallT 'l-hisba) of Fustat to control the grain trade in the town.49 Apparently, the force that usually was at his disposal was inadequate to deal with the situation.
Some military formations, such as the Jawwdla, can be identified as having been composed of cabid.50 Al-Farahiyya and cAtufiyya were corps made up of black slave troops.5' Al-Hakim's escort (rikdbiyya, suite of riders) was manned by a unit of black slaves called al-Sacdiyya, who, while armed with swords, became his henchmen. They were in close contact with al-Hakim who bestowed patronage on them.52 Byzantine emissaries who arrived at al-Hakim's court regarded them as being sufficiently important to distribute presents among them.53 In Jumada II 395/March-April 1005, for unknown reasons, al-Hakim purged the unit killing 50 men (the total strength of the rikabiyya is put at 100) including their commander (sahib al-rikdb).54 Additional information on the blacks can be gained from Nasir-i Khusrau who mentions 30,000 'abid al-shiraD together with 20,000 black Masamida troops and 30,000 Zanj, who always fought with the sword. References to Zanj (East African) infantry cannot be found in other sources.55 Masamida were Berbers from the Western Maghreb. Nasir-i Khusrau, however, says that they were blacks and characterized them as infantry who used lances and swords. In 415/1024, Masamida troops were stationed in Aleppo.56 Other references to them are rare.57
The Turks
The Turks arrived in Cairo following al-CAzTz's victory (368/978) over AlptakTn and his allies in Palestine. AlptakTn, who was of Turkish slave extraction, had fled from Baghdad as a result of internal struggles among the Buyids. In 364/975, he was invited to Damascus with his cavalry of 300 or 400 ghilman by the local leader of the ahddth, who sought independence from the Fatimids. Alptakin's rule in Damascus posed a threat to the Fatimids. There are two main versions of the battle between al-'Aziz and Alptakin. Maqrizi says that Alptakin led a combined force made up of Qarmatians and members of the Buyid clan who fled from Baghdad with their Daylam and Persian troops. Shortly after the fighting had erupted the Daylams asked for aman, which was granted to the Buyid chiefs along with their officers and troops, and Alptakin was later captured. Alptakin's army was 12,000 strong and al-'AzTz's numbered 70,000.58 Ibn al-Qalanisi says that Alptakin and the Qarmatians faced al-'Aziz alone, and claims that Alptakin's losses were as high as 20,000.59 The discrepancy between these two accounts is significant. Maqrizi's description gives the impression that entire units of the enemy surrendered intact while Ibn al-Qalanisi's account precludes this possibility, pointing to the heavy losses which Alptakin's army suffered. Ibn al-Qalanisi's figure seems highly inflated. Moreover, any unnecessary carnage of the defeated enemy would have been contrary to al-'AzTz's intentions and interests, which were to attract Alptakin and his men into his service. 
THE PROVISIONING OF THE ARMY
The sovereign, the Fatimid imam, was responsible for the equipping and provisioning of the army.162 Arms were divided among the soldiers on the eve of a battle and when troops were mustered for a campaign.163 This does not necessarily mean that troops were without arms during peace time, and they kept weapons in their homes.164 However, these were apparently inadequate for battle. In fact, arms were freely available in Cairo's arms market (suq al-silah), to which the general population had access. In 403/1012-1013, in response to policies of al-Hakim which caused unrest in the capital, the population armed itself. Maqrizi says that even riffraff (al-'awamm) and craftsmen (al-sunnd'), who normally went unarmed, acquired knives and swords.'65 In 415/1024-1025, when al-Zahir was unable to provide the usual military escort for the caravan of the North African hajj, the Berbers of Masamida, who accompanied the caravan, had purchased plenty of arms in Cairo and had successfully protected the caravan from attack by the Cabid and Qaysariyya.l66 The state itself actually bought weapons on the Cairo market. In 402/1011-1012, for example, arms were bought from merchants (tujjar) to replenish the state's armory.167 Al-Zahir is credited with establishing the state's armory (khizdna al-bunud), which was an arsenal and a workshop employing 3,000 craftsmen for producing arms.'68
The state was also responsible for the army's riding and pack animals. Accounts of al-'Aziz's preparations for war against the Byzantines (386/996) hint at the size of the royal stables. Al-'Aziz had 12,000 horses and 30,000 camels to carry his, and his close aides', provisions. The Kutama were given 4,000 horses and provided with money to buy 1,000 more.169 The troops usually kept their horses during peace time. In 415/1025, for example, the Kutama complained of a lack of riding animals.'70 To maintain stables of the size that al-CAziz had maintained must have been a considerable drain on state resources. Riding animals were sent as gifts and tributes from vassals and friendly states. The sources list many examples of consignments including hundreds of horses, camels, she camels, mules, and she mules, with and without saddles and bridles. This indicates the value and importance of riding animals to the state.71' In contrast, weapons are rarely mentioned among the presents and tributes sent to Cairo.172 Stores (khazain) of saddles and bridles were usually kept in the palace. Al-Mu'izz brought stores with him from North Africa. High-ranking dignitaries of the state who had their own military personnel also kept stores of provisions and stables. Details on the so-called khazdain al-wujuh wa-'l-khdssa are not contained in the sources.7
The loss of weapons and military equipment during the period of civil war under al-Mustansir was immense. For example, precious items such as Kafur's sword, al-Mu'izz's personal weapons, and even the Prophet's sword-the famous Dhu 'l-Faqar-were looted. The khaza'in were completely depleted.'74
PAYMENT OF THE ARMY AND THE QUESTION OF IQTAC
In section three, the functions of the administrative personnel responsible for the administration and paying of the army are discussed. In this section, the system of payment is reviewed.
As can be expected, the expenses for the army and for military campaigns were enormous. No systematic data are available, but scattered information reveals the huge sums involved.175 The economic consequences are obvious: paying the army under the best of conditions constituted a considerable drain on state resources. Repercussions from an inability to meet the financial demands of the army were discussed in section two.
The It had happened in the past, but never with such unleashed violence and severe, widespread consequences. The worsening economic situation in the years preceding the outbreak of the internal struggle within the army had a direct and immediate relevance for both the struggle itself and the ability of the regime in controlling, mitigating, or manipulating it. The economic crisis served as a powerful catalyst. Once under way, the prolonged struggle precluded a recovery of the economy. The medieval historians made a clear distinction between natural disasters (for example, the low rise of the Nile) and man-made calamities. The latter were the worst. Even when the Nile rose sufficiently, no land could be cultivated when there was a lack of security. Christian sources tell about the destruction that the Lawata inflicted on the cultivated lands of Lower Egypt which they had overrun. Their very presence (40,000 horsemen with their families, atbac) imposed a heavy burden upon the population on which they preyed. The Lawata, who cultivated the land, neglected the irrigation works and paid no taxes to the government. The re-establishment of order under Badr al-JamalT, and his exemption of the peasants from taxes for a period of three years, paved the way for the country's economic recovery.90
Although economic recovery was achieved, the period of internal anarchy resulted in a profound military weakness in the Fatimid state which was much more difficult to overcome than the economic crisis. Many units suffered heavy losses in the internal fighting during the period of anarchy and Badr's purge of the army also contributed.9"' It seems that the restoration of the army's morale and cohesion was a difficult task, if it was achieved at all. The ethnic diversity of the Fatimid army was further complicated by the arrival of Badr's private contingent of Armenians. The two main antagonistic groups, the blacks and the Easterners, continued to serve in the Fatimid army. Badr's drive against the cabid in Upper Egypt came to a halt because of Atsiz's invasion. Apparently, Badr arrived at some sort of accommodation with them, inasmuch as they (al-sudan) fought alongside him against Atsiz. In fact, their attack crushed Atsiz's center (qalb). The final elimination of the blacks took place only under Saladin.
The restoration of the military power of the Fatimid army was also hampered by the material losses during the period of anarchy. Much of the military equipment, weapons, riding and pack animals was lost. The sources provide plenty of detail on the huge quantities of arms which were looted from the storehouses at the royal palace and either sold on the market or simply destroyed.92 The royal stables, which contained tens of thousands of animals, were completely depleted.'93
The scholarly discussion of Fatimid foreign policy under Badr and his son, al-Afdal, focuses on their intentions, whether they continued with an aggressive foreign policy toward both the Islamic and non-Islamic worlds (originating from the fundamental Fatimid doctrinal tenets) or whether they abandoned the Fatimid imperial dream in favor of a policy focusing more on Egypt.'94 What is lacking in this discussion is a consideration of the weakness of the Fatimid state and its inability to pursue an active foreign policy backed by military force.'95 Judging from the policy followed by Badr and his son, one can suggest that they had a desire to conduct a foreign policy drawn on a grand scale, in Syria and elsewhere, but that state resources were no longer able to sustain this desire. 
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